Eminent Domain
The principle upon which all governmental acquisitions are based is the Crown's right of 'eminent domain' -die axiomatic power of governments to take private property for public purposes. There is no constitutional right to property in Australian law; ownership, like free speech and the right of assembly, is a residual right that waxes or wanes according to the restrictions which federal and State laws place upon it
The Commonwealth and the States do have acquisition acts which set out general procedures for the resumption of property and the payment of compensation. But these laws have no special constitutional status; they are ordinary legislation that can be repealed or amended at any time by a bare parliamentary majority. Only tradition and public opinion prevent the States from resuming property without compensation; and occasionally those inhibitions are cast aside. Since 1900 several Australian States have simply confiscated private rights to petroleum or to minerals -rights originally granted by them to early freeholders. As recently as 1981 New South Wales passed a Coal Acquisition Act which abolished all private ownership of coal deposits in the State. (Some ex gratia compensation was grudgingly paid several years later.)
Only the Commonwealth has a constitutional duty to pay ' just terms' for property that it compulsorily acquires. In 1988 a proposal of the Hawke Labor Government to extend the 'just terms' guarantee to State constitutions was rejected at a national refer endum. However, even if an all-Australian 'just terms' clause had come to pass it may not have been so efficacious as it supporters expected. In the hands of the High Court the Commonwealth's own constitutional 'guarantee' is proving, under m odem conditions, to be an insurance policy with some disconcerting exclusion clauses.
According to the doctrine of eminent domain, the giving of reasonable notice and the payment of proper compensation are left to political morality and gentlemanly understandings. But it appears that the Founding Fathers were not prepared to trust their child, the Commonwealth, to that extent They embedded the traditional under standing in Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution:
The Parliament shall . . . have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . acquisition of property on just terms f rom any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.
In 1979 Chief Justice Barwick described this provision as a 'very great constitutional safeguard'. But until the term 'acquisition' is more liberally and realistically inter preted that statement will have more than a touch of hyperbole.
'Just Terms'
In the 'just terms' clause there are three elements: property; acquisition; and proper compensation. A great deal of ink has been spilt on all three but at this stage of our constitutional history, and in the light of the Commonwealth's rapidly increasing inter vention in land-use law -once very largely a State concern -the 'acquisition' con-cept needs especially close attention. 'Property' and 'just terms' are already quite lib erally interpreted. 'Property' covers leaseholds as well as freeholds. It is not confined to land: it includes intangibles such as copyright and other intellectual property. In 1982 it was said that 'in modem legal systems "property" embraces every possible in terest recognised by law which a person can have in anything and includes practically all valuable rights'. In a recent case relating to the Tim or Gap treaty between Aus tralia and Indonesia, 'property', as a constitutional term, was extended to oil explora tion licences which were cancelled by the Commonwealth when the treaty came into being.
However, the 'just terms' clause is no stronger than its weakest link and 'acquisition' is interpreted narrowly. The significance of this restriction is growing rapidly. The narrowness probably did not matter much when acquisitions by the Commonwealth were relatively straightforward and traditional affairs. Until the 1970s land-use law in Australia was largely a State concern. The Commonwealth intervened only now and then to acquire land for purposes such as defence, communications and aviation. It emerges from the Tasmanian Dam case (1983) that Commonwealth environ mental policies can virtually 'sterilise' State or private land without bringing into play the duty to pay 'just terms', provided that the legal title is left in the name of the owner affected. This is so because the current judicial meaning o f 'acquisition' is wedded to old technicalities of private land law. According to this school of thought there is no 'acquisition' unless the Commonwealth takes an outright conveyance of property and formally places the title in its own name. Thus the meaning of 'acquisition' remains incongruously narrow and formalistic while judicial creativity, not to mention the oc casional legal revolution, flourishes in other High Court jurisprudence. Government intervention in the name of the environment, aboriginal rights, 'heritage values' and so on -intervention which is often election-driven and difficult to predict -is now such that the value of property can be destroyed or gready diminished without com pensation so long as tide or possession has not been taken, in die parlance of the cottage conveyancer.
This approach is questionable on technical as well as philosophical grounds. In legal dieory 'property' is not the physical object (if indeed there be a physical object) to which die rights of ownership are attached. It refers to the rights diemselves. Those rights are better diought of as a 'bundle' of entidements: rights o f entry, rights to ex clude others, rights to cultivate, to build, and so on. If, for example, I lease my land to anodier person I have lost -for the duration of the lease -the right to occupy and to use diat land. For die time being I am deprived of several items in my bundle of property rights. I retain die reversion (die right to resume full ownership when die lease ends) and in the meantime I may have limited rights of entry and inspection. But the rest of die bundle is in the tenant's hands.
Similarly, when government removes or diminishes rights to property without assuming full ownership it should be seen as 'acquiring' a proportionate number of die rights in the proprietary 'bundle'. The reasons for adopting this more flexible and more realistic approach are all die stronger when (as here) we are talking of 'acquisition' in die context of a Constitution, a set of fundamental principles which govern die making of federal laws. It is a High Court truism (never more so than to day) diat die Commonwealth Constitution is to be interpreted more liberally dian die words of a land sale contract, a mortgage deed or a consignment note. The mantra of 'liberal construction' has been invoked to give die Commonwealth far greater powers widi respect to taxation, 'trade and commerce', offshore resources and company law dian were dreamt of 50 years ago. More recent, not to say spectacular, is the ex tremely wide interpretation of die previously modest 'external affairs' power since 1983. This development alone has probably enabled die Commonwealdi, equipped itself widi a suitable treaty or 'international concern', to take over any legislative power of die States whedier or not it is mentioned in any odier part of die Constitution. Given a plausible 'external affair', die question is no longer: 'Can die Commonwealdi legally do such-and-such?' but radier: 'Does die Commonwealdi want to do it?'
Having paved die legal padi to a unitary State, the High Court -appointed en tirely by federal cabinet or its advisers -has now turned to die discovery of 'implied' bill of rights provisions in die federal Constitution and even in a State Constitution. While diese legislative activities of die Court may be seen by its members as based on intuitions of 'contemporary values', it may be remembered that so recently as 1988 Australians emphatically voted 'no' at a referendum which included several 'Bill of Rights' issues. 1 he one impermissible implication, it almost seems, is that the Consti tution is a federal compact. This impression is not dispelled when the occasional crumb of consolation is given to the States, such as allowing Victoria to maintain its own public service but not to set the salaries and conditions of their employment,10 or striking down W estern Australia's native tide laws and finding one small and insignifi cant flaw in die Commonwealth Act
Nor is die High Court averse to unsettling or extending die rules of private law. In one of die most recent exercises of its legisladve jurisdiction die Court made a contribudon to solving die problem of gross over-expansion of our law schools by creating a new rule which allows second, third and even fourdi-hand owners of homes (and presumably commercial premises as well) to sue die builder for alleged defects in ma terials or die construction work.
I he present question is not whedier diese novel decisions are wise, or widiin die proper limits of judicial power. The point here is diat when decisions of diis breaddi are being taken die High Court's restrictive approach to 'acquisition' is a prime ex ample of straining at a gnat.
'Acquisition' in the Tasmanian Dam Case
It is a curious irony diat the 'cottage conveyancing' approach to die 'just terms' clause was reasserted in die very case diat practically converts die 'external affairs' power into a plenary legislative power. In die Tasmanian Dam case die Commonwealth, in the name of international obligations (and in hot pursuit of immediate political advan tages) effectively 'sterilised' a large area of soudi-west Tasmania, the property of die State and its agencies. I henceforth diere could be no development of die land widiout the Commonwealth's permission. This article does not seek to re-argue die po litical, social or even die legal merits of diat action. O ur present concern is die sharp contrast between the Court's liberal interpretation ol die external affairs power (which benefited die Commonwealdi) and its narrow, formalistic interpretation of acquisition (which also favoured die Commonwealdi). A wide meaning was given to words which suited die Commonwealdi and a 19di-century, black-letter approach was taken to one word diat would have given some solace to die property owner. Justice Mason, the senior judge in a majority of 4 to 3, dismissed the plea for a realistic definition of 'acquisition' as follows:
Tasmania's submission is that, although die Act does not attempt to divest ti de from die State . . it so restricts {its] rights . . . that there has been an acqui sition of property . . . IButl to bring the constitutional provision into play it is not enough diat legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right tiiat an owner enjoys in relation to his property; diere must be an acquisition whereby die Commonwealdi or anodier acquires an interest in property . . Laymen too readily accept lawyers' value-judgments presented as professional and technical mysteries. W idiout die guidance of die High Court ordinary citizens might be forgiven for thinking diat, when die government leaves a landowner holding die tide deed but forbids him to use 'his' land widiout its permission, he is no longer 'in all respects' die owner.
Justice Murphy, a champion of broad constitutional interpretation, momentarily became a black-letter property lawyer when faced widi Tasmania's claim diat if die Commonwealdi controls were valid (which it denied) dien at least compensation must be paid. (Did it cross die majority's mind diat, in that event, the price of die Commonwealdi's fireworks display might be prohibitive?) Justice Murphy simply asserted that 'die extinction or limitation of property rights does not amount to acquisition' and diat, lor all die talk at odier times about die 'spirit' of die Constitution, diere was no 'acquisition'.
Justice Brennan, too, was dismissive: 'The free enjoyment of proprietary rights . .. may be affected by a great variety of laws, but ]s.51 (xxxi)] extends only to laws for die acquisition of proprietary rights . . . [So] die question of just terms does not arise.'* However, one judge in die majority-Justice Deane -recalled dial a distinguished former Chief Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, had said some 35 years earlier diat die 'just terms' guarantee is 'not to be confined pedantically to the taking of tide . . . but . . . 14 Id. 146, empliasis added.
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extends to innominate and anomalous interests'. Deane J was inclined to think that when intervention approaches 'sterilisation' the difference of degree becomes a differ ence of kind. If the Court continued to force the ' just terms' guarantee into the pi geonhole of ordinary conveyancing law the Commonwealth could make a mockery of s.51 (xxxi) provided that it left the tide deeds in die hands of the 'owner':
The Commonwealdi has, by the Wilderness Reguladons, brought about a position where the HEC land is effectively frozen . . . If there were any reason in principle which prevented . . . [diat from being] an acquisition of property, die safeguard of s.51(xxxi) would be ineffective to preclude die Common wealdi from . . . dedicating die property of odiers to its [own] purposes with out compensation . . . by the imposition of carefully-worded restrictions.. . Besides, even if private law technicalities had to be adhered to, Deane J diought diat die present case called for 'just terms'. In his opinion, the Commonwealth's banning of die Franklin Dam development was akin to a 'restrictive covenant', such as a legally enforceable promise diat a landowner who subdivides an old property may impose on new neighbours to ensure (for example) diat they do not erect buildings which spoil his scenic views. And he who takes a restrictive covenant acquires a species of prop erty right
Acquisition and Regulation
If we are to have broader and broader interpretations of die Commonwealth Consti tution, it should not matter whedier diey suit die central government or not. If a real istic interpretation of 'acquisition' makes federal vote-catching more expensive, and leads politicians and their advisers to count more carefully die costs of 'government by pressure group', dien die public interest, on balance, may be served.
The main defence of die narrow meaning of 'acquisition' is diat a more liberal approach would raise difficult questions of degree, not to mention claims upon die federal Treasury diat may be so large as to force interventionist politicians and bu reaucrats to diink again. W hen would reasonable regulation of property rights be come an 'acquisition'? At first glance diis may seem a sage objection, but it is really an evasive counsel of despair. In trudi, die law is already replete widi questions of degree; on many issues of damages and compensation die courts are left to draw a line according to die evidence and every day diey do so. For example: W here does rea sonable care begin and end? W hen is die harm caused by an alleged nuisance unrea sonably out of keeping widi any benefits flowing from die action in question, and the character of die neighbourhood? W hen does a trade restraint become 'unreasonably' tilted against die interests of die person restrained, or die public interest? And in die constitutional arena: W hen is an exercise of die 'defence power' proportionate to die current needs of national security? W hen are administrative arrangements 'reasonably incidental' to one of the Commonwealth's 'heads of power'? Similarly, if a more flexible approach were taken to 'acquisition' as opposed to 'regulation', there would be borderline cases upon which reasonable minds might differ, but the same counsel of despair (or inertia) can be applied to many other areas of private and public law.
The task of nominating the point at which regulation shades into acquisition is not a peculiarly Australian problem. The American courts have also had to deal with questions of when official (or officious) controls become a 'taking' of property within die meaning of the Fifth Amendment to die Constitution of the United States. The US Supreme Court has not found it necessary to insist diat a resumption or 'taking' less dian 100 per cent is not an acquisition. Cases of alleged 'taking' widiout 'just compensation' are decided upon die particular facts (Walters, 1994) .
In a small way, perhaps, some Australian States have found a way of compensat ing owners of premises placed on 'heritage' registers. An owner of such a property may reasonably ask why he should have to bear the expense, in maintenance and capi tal depreciation, of a perceived amenity to die community in general. One way of ad justing die balance is to reduce local-audiority rates and land taxes proportionately. If diis is not done at die administrative level die courts may do it on appeal. In 1991 Brisbane's stately Queensland Club won a large reduction in its land taxes in that way. In die following year die owners of an inner-Brisbane building erected in 1882 had dieir valuation, for rating purposes, reduced from $1,500,000 to $300,000. If die High Court adheres to a narrow view of 'acquisition', it would be well widiin federal powers to institute a predictable scheme of tax concessions, bounties or grants to re dress die sterilising effects of environmental and other fashionable interventions.
T he points raised in diis article are highlighted by recent applications of 'Aboriginal heritage' laws in the Northern Territory and Soudi Australia. It is widely known diat die Mabo 'native tide' doctrine does not apply to freehold lands or to Crown lands devoted to public purposes. It is not nearly SO well known dial diese limitations do not apply to ministerial decrees under native 'heritage' laws. A substan tial portion of a freehold residential block in Alice Springs has been 'sterilised' to pro tect a recendy discovered sacred site (The Australian, 10 April 1995, p. 12). Much more spectacular is die Hindmarsh Island bridge affair, in which a ministerial order issued under die Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act may result in losses to die contractors of $50m, widi consequential losses to local busi nesses and property owners diat could be as high as $ 175m (The Courier Mail, 27 May 1995, p.34) . In die latter case, if die courts eventually decide diat Aboriginal Af fairs Minister Robert Tickner has exceeded his powers, compensation may be pay able; but odierwise, as die constitutional exegesis stands, die Commonwealdi can deny diat any 'acquisition' has occurred.
